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THE ROUTINIZATION OF LOVE

by

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THE ROUTINIZATION OF LOVE

Structure and Process in Primary Relations

Whenever we search for the roots of human fulfillment or courage or creativity, we soon confront the fact of love. To be sure, the word itself appears but rarely in scientific reports; but those reports are filled with terms which catch some aspect, phase, or variety of love. We are told, for example, that the parents of psychiatrically healthy children are "nurturant" or "permissive" or "supportive" and make only "reasonable" demands of youngsters (136).^{*} Soldiers "integrated into" or "solidary with" their officers, units, or comrades display higher morale in battle (132). "Cooperation" sometimes enhances productivity (41, 78, 96). Intellectually creative adults are "secure" in their relations with others and "dedicated" to the realization of long-range objectives (103, 104). Men who withstand the rigors of imprisonment in concentration camps have a comparable dedication (20, 21) as do families which thrive despite an abrupt loss of income (4, 29, 87).

These discoveries concern only some bits and facets of love. Observations which capture more of its features relate with even greater strength to variations in behavior and experience. To illustrate, it has been shown that parental supportiveness is associated with the mental health of children only when the support is dependable and is directed toward promoting the child's growing independence (79). This reveals something that most people understand;

^{*} Numbers in parentheses refer to the item in the bibliography.

that overprotection is not love, and altruism without justice may signify masochism or dominance rather than mature concern and respect.

Such illustrations also encourage the judgment that research guided by an even more comprehensive view of love's character, development, and dynamics would possess a still greater power for explanation and might largely resolve many contradictions in present findings. My present objective is to move toward a statement of that larger view as a necessary preliminary to more effective research.

Why is it that love, loving, and being loved help us explain so much of importance in human conduct? If love enhances a man's satisfaction, personal force, and social responsibility and underlies the flowering of his capacities, what are its sources and how can it be encouraged? Can one routinize the presence and potency of so subtle a relationship as love? Are the tensions and problems which often accompany love inherently uncontrollable or can they, like love's presence, be directed and modified? We must say what love means before these questions can be answered.

THE MEANING OF LOVE

The objects of love are many. The occasions for love are various. The means by which love is shown are great in number. But, within these variations, there is a common theme, an essential meaning (21, 39, 65, 67, 85, 94, 103, 104, 141, 142). At least within our

cultural tradition there is general agreement about the meaning of love, and people commonly feel they can identify the genuine article from the counterfeit.

In common usage, love stands for that relationship in which people are committed knowingly, willingly, freely, and responsibly to enhance each other's lives and growth in whatever ways they can. Loving is behavior which expresses these mutual commitments. If any one of the ingredients in this definition is found missing, the genuineness of the love is suspect. Thus if a person initiates this sort of association but is not committed to it, he is condemned as arousing false expectations, as "trifling with" the other's life, as being insincere and, if only by implication, committing a breach of promise (17). Again, if love is genuine it involves a somewhat conscious choice. People try to learn whether persons seeming to extend love do so knowingly, or whether they will withdraw from the relationship when they see its implications. Further, enhancement is not to be called love if it is extended unwillingly or if the enhancer's will is not free--is coerced by forces and interests he does not consider consistent with his personal desires (27, 33, 75). In addition, as Fromm (67) says, attempts at enhancement unrestrained by responsibility, by efforts to do only that for which one is competent, contain great hazards (60). They can easily become negligent, inconsiderate, or thoughtless.

Genuine love is also defined as a diffuse relationship. The individual does not elect to perform one or more particular acts, but to assist, by whatever means he can, in bringing about a certain

state of affairs. His commitment is fulfilled only when that state is achieved. For some commitments, such as those to promote the welfare of one's family or friends or country, no final achievement is possible.

Genuine love does not require that people be committed to enhance all aspects of each other's lives. It does require that they stand ready to do what they can with respect to those aspects of the other's concerns for which they accept responsibility. This may, for example, be the nurturance by colleagues of each other's professional growth, or the teacher's devotion to his student as student, or the support any men give each other as fellow citizens or as co-workers or as comrades in a common enterprise.

Finally, in authentic love, this generalized commitment is guided by the concern to nourish the powers, independence, and integration of the other--to promote not just that which is presently in his interest but to assist his partner in developing interests that he will find of even greater worth (59). Ideal friends wish not only that one will be what he is, but that one will become the more enriched person that he may.

The notion that partners in love must be equals has its great relevance at this point. As many successful marriages and friendships demonstrate, the participants may be quite unequal in the nature or absolute amount of their contributions to one another (76, 155). There is, however, one respect in which equality is required for the success of their relationship as love. They must be similar in the proportion of their requirements which are satisfied through

this relationship. One of them may get far more than the other if enhancement is measured in absolute amount, but they must be equal in the importance for each of whatever he receives. This equivalence of relative reward and cost is the ultimate guarantee that each will take the relationship with equal seriousness and insures that each will respect the independence and integrity of his partners (82).

The problem of distinguishing genuine love from its counterfeits is especially difficult because some of love's several ingredients can be present without the others, and because the mixture of those which are available at a particular time is subject to great and unanticipated modifications. Farber (55) documents the independence of love's various facets in a study of the relations of 495 husbands with their wives. He measured the extent to which each man was able correctly to interpret his wife's attitudes and intentions and anticipate and predict her behavior, the resourcefulness of each in devising new and effective responses to problematic interpersonal situations, the ability of each for handling interpersonal tensions where self-esteem was threatened or challenged, and the degree to which each was cooperative and supportive. There is no relationship between a man's rating on any of these measures and his scores on the others.

The difficulties of evaluating professed love are further increased by the subtlety of the judgments required. Reasonable accuracy in these matters reflects extensive training and high skill. By some means, much of the population acquires facility in making such judgments.

THE RELEVANCE OF LOVE

Why is love important for so many aspects of human life and experience? Having said what love means, one can answer this further question. We must consider love's significance for the lover as well as for the one who is loved.

Love's most obvious importance is for the person who receives it. It nurtures to a degree and in a fashion unique in human experience. This unusual nurturance flows from love's properties as perhaps the most complete instance of social interaction. [Interestingly, the more exquisite forms of sadism seem to be among love's closer competitors for this distinction (15, 21, 58, pp. 354-358, 67, pp. 18-20 and 30-31, 69, pp. 12-48, 72, chapters 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9)].

Men can relate to each other in several ways. They can interact, for example, as do physical bodies, exerting blind force on one another. Social interaction refers to situations in which people take each other's knowledge, intentions, preferences, hopes, beliefs and the like into account. It refers, in short, to men relating to each other's minds. Social interaction can occur if people learn that they depend on one another, if they come to appreciate the essential requirements for their continued association, if they have some experiences in common which they can share, if they possess standardized symbols to serve as a medium for the expressing and sharing of experience in a form that will be understood, if they have become aware of the existence and importance of their own and each other's mental life and the conditions under which it can be influenced. These are the

understandings and skills in which parents first train their children and easy competence in their use--competence employed despite great obstacles and in a wide variety of situations--is customarily taken as the mark of an individual's maturity. A life-time of exploration and experience seems not to exhaust the potentiality for further significant growth in such competence.

The special nurturance which love provides is its support for the individual's mental life as, for example, the wisdom with which he formulates objectives, the appropriateness of his choices from among alternatives, the security with which he can venture and take risks, the effectiveness of his efforts to make restitution for errors and to find and accept forgiveness, the justness with which he evaluates failures, and the gaiety or contentment with which he celebrates a success. A loving relationship provides not just particular deeds that lead to such benefits, but whatever acts will have these results. So generalized or diffuse a commitment, requires that the person who offers love relate not merely to another's immediate behavior, but to his long-term purposes and potentialities and to changes that will occur in them. Within this generalized relationship more specialized forms of interaction can grow as the occasion may demand. They will be particular applications of love to given situations, but love is their general form and their source. In return, a loving relationship costs the loved individual the commitment to employ these resources for the maintenance and development of himself as a person--as a minded individual who interacts with the minds of others. Because love, or an association bordering on it, so

often provides the infant's first social experience and because it affords general principles to be employed in developing more specialized forms of social interaction, Cooley spoke of love as the socially "primary" relation and of the groups most distinguished by it as "primary groups" (13, 25, 36, 37, 57, 119, 124).

Thinking only of receiving love, men commonly make of this relationship the foundation for their pictures of utopia. But the cost of being loved can be substantial. Stagnation may prove easier than growth, wisdom may appear less desirable than immediate action, and forgiveness may prove harder to bear than the absence of love. A man may prefer to receive fear or blind admiration from others because these require no changes in him. Love, as psychotherapists and theologians insist, is work for him who receives it as well as he who provides it. Willingness to perform such work is founded on a sense of need and consequent gratitude and humility.

Although it is sensible to speak of the members of a formal group as loving each other, such love will not be as diffuse as that possible between particular individuals (1). This is so because the leaders or members of a formal group define their responsibilities toward each other in terms of the joint enterprise in which they are engaged, not toward all enterprises in which any of them may engage as individuals. Love between individuals, interpersonal love, has the possibility of this widest of references. This may be why many writers treat it as the standard for all expressions of love.

Greater scope is not the only benefit which interpersonal love may provide. Because it can be directed to all of an individual's

interests it is of unusual importance in assisting his personal integration. Each individual is at once a particular organism, the bearer of a distinctive history from previous experiences, and the center of a unique set of present conditions. In most of his relations with other people he is expected to employ some of his skills and tastes and inhibit others. What he is obliged to do or to forego varies from one group to another and often is the subject of conflicting instructions. But the individual as a sentient being is not divisible. Organism, mind, and relations with others, even with diverse or conflicting others, are coessential in his existence. His ability to achieve fulfillment as a single, total being requires that all his several aspects with their differing, competing requirements become organized.

The love of another person can nurture him as a distinctive individual. It can, for example, help him interpret the application of general social rules to his particular situation, needs, and deeds. This is possible not only because interpersonal love can relate to the whole of a given individual's situation, but because love is, as we have seen, the most generalized and complete form of social interaction itself. The more general the principles, the greater is the range of special situations to which they may be applied and for which they may supply guidance. The most generalized principles of a fully developed social relationship are thus the ground for the integration of particular individuals with themselves and with the social order. To be fulfilled most completely as a distinctive

individual in all one's particularity, one must enter into the most profoundly social of relationships.

We have found that love's special importance for the person who receives it is its nurture of some large range of his interests as a minded individual, that this is perhaps true in greatest degree of interpersonal love, and that some people consider the costs of receiving love to outweigh its benefits. But what of the person who gives love? What is its importance for him? If one views man as living only for rewards, then getting love is the chief thing. It is in studies that treat man as being most fulfilled when expanding or exercising his powers that we obtain a picture of love's significance for the lover (2, 67).

Loving, say these accounts, is the expression of the highest social skill. It is the sign of real maturity, full membership in humanity. It employs most completely those talents which seem to distinguish men from all other animals and in which they most resemble God. [Although one cannot be certain which is cause and which effect, one large-scale investigation reports that lack of friends in childhood is highly related to the incidence and severity of mental disorder in adulthood (90).]

Loving deals with difficult and challenging problems forever leading men to new, stimulating experiences. For a mature person, loving is the embodiment of his essential self and he delights in both the exercise of his potency and the evidence for it. To live is to act. To act as other than what one is is frustrating. Therefore, the argument goes, mature people get their greatest fulfillment in

loving. As Fromm (67) writes, the theme of maturity is that "I need you because I love you," not "I love you because I need you."

To be sure, gains from auto-fulfillment are not the only importance love is said to have for lovers. He who loves is often applauded by others and this may be sufficient reward. Loving another is often the requisite for obtaining another's love, and, if so, he who wants to be loved must first love others. Finally, one may love another to end an intolerable separation or estrangement, not so much because one wants the other's love but because one wants to be with him or at peace with him and there is no relationship short of love that will bridge the gap.

However important love may be in human affairs, it certainly is not enough for man's survival or accomplishment. Health, rationality, self-government, competence in modifying the environment to serve human needs, skill in framing symbols to represent, objectify, and bring order into experience--these capacities and abilities and many others are among the essentials (60, 85). Most of them are required for love to arise and many seem to require love in order to increase their fruition.

THE ROUTINIZATION OF LOVE

If, as now, love itself is our concern, we shall find several guides to relevant literature. Materials concerning the rearing of children have been collated and appraised (7, 28) as have modern investigations of such related matters as interpersonal

perceptiveness (137), self control and responsibility (56, 121, 136), the legitimacy of political systems (80, 88, 98), and the psychological characteristics of friends (47). To contribute to this developing synthesis, I focus primarily, though not exclusively, on problems of establishing, developing, and maintaining love in certain groups of intermediate size most of which have adults as their principal clientele. Thus many observations I report are taken from studies of cloistered religious bodies, collective settlements, primitive societies, fraternal organizations, small groups of workers, professional organizations, therapeutic milieux, and gangs.

There are several reasons for this emphasis. I wanted, above all, to bring together observations relevant for research concerning the social organization of love--the development, routinization, and management of this most generalized form of social interaction. I sought to find in patterns of social organization some sources of love and of its stability and natural history. The structure of this social organization tends to be more visible in settings somewhat larger than friendships or nuclear families because the requirement of coordinating a large number of people forces on participants a considerable degree of awareness concerning the objective they seek and the means appropriate to it. What might be a spontaneous and fleeting adjustment between friends often becomes a matter of policy and doctrine in larger groups, and, consequently, becomes apparent to an observer. (Curiously, there is only a sparse literature which considers the social organization of love in marriages or families.)

To further enlarge the chance of finding relevant material, I chose, second, to focus on relationships in which love was a salient concern. I sought, third, to study settings in which interpersonal love of wide scope might be expected together with more impersonal social relations--this to increase the range of considerations under investigation. Finally, I omitted some important manifestations of love (patriotism, for example) because relatively little is known about them.

A. Establishment

Where will loving appear? How do its scope and form get established? By what means is its genuineness determined? The very definition of love suggests a part of the answers to these questions.

1. The occurrence of love: It seems plausible to think that loving is likely to occur when people find that they are similar in their relative need for one another to be what each potentially is, providing that this need is satisfied not by a few readily specified acts to be performed at certain times but by the performance of whatever acts may be appropriate to meet changing conditions. To forecast the occurrence of love we should know the degree to which all these conditions are met.

a. Diffuse dependency: Adequate evidence is lacking on all these matters, but a considerable body of observations support the notion that a diffuse dependency is one requisite for love. Thus both Sarma (120) and Eisenstadt (51, 52) conclude independently and from cross-cultural studies that one type of highly personalized attachment, friendship, appears in the more complex societies. Both

interpret the rise of friendship as signifying a relation which helps particular individuals in complex societies to thread their way among the many groups and institutions which make demands on their allegiance and which, often, set conflicting requirements for their behavior. The problem each individual faces has multiple facets which change from time to time, requiring a comparably many-sided and adaptable relationship to mediate them.

Again, the informal groups of friends and co-workers that grow spontaneously within large organizations seem to flourish in situations where people depend on each other in many important ways that are difficult to govern or specify in advance and for which no formal rules are laid down. General norms are required to guide conduct in these circumstances. One, the norm of reciprocity, is discussed by Gouldner (74) who suggests that two social rules are universal: 1) people should help those who have helped them, and 2) people should not injure those who have helped them. Such a statement of reciprocity, he continues, is necessary to control the effects of power differences, and, because the principle is very general, it can be applied to countless ad hoc transactions not otherwise regulated by specific status obligations. The norm also reinforces specific obligations which may be present. In all cases, it provides a basis for confidence that one's friendly overtures toward another will be returned. The ubiquity and importance of such a norm is epitomized in one account of the fleeting relations between cab drivers and their customers.

Even in an urban and highly secularized society..., most service relationships, be they between a professional and his client or a menial and his patron, are characterized by certain constraints on too crass a rendering and consuming of the service... (40, p. 158).

It also seems that the increase of diffuse dependencies that are, correspondingly, hard to supervise or control provides impetus for the spread of the "human relations" approach in bureaucratic organizations (46, 108, pp. 30-60 and 196-213). Managers in those settings are told they must obtain the commitment of their more skilled personnel to the organization's interests precisely because such persons are essential to the organization's work yet hard to supervise. If they are not on the employer's side, they can damage his interests and he will know it only after the damage has occurred. The stress on love (typically phrased as supervisory relations governed by adaptability to individual needs and by a spirit of collaborative consultation) is openly justified as required to obtain and retain skilled personnel because the supply is short and such other attractions as salary and hours are relatively equal from one organization to another.

It is impossible to examine each familiar setting in which love flourishes to see whether a diffuse dependency preceded the occurrence of devotion and affection, but a few additional illustrations may indicate the range of affairs over which such dependency seems to be a precondition for love: the responsibility of professional men for their clients, the devotion of a family's members for each other's concerns, the affectionate care of a citizen for

his country. Illustrations like these which suggest that love grows where people are broadly dependent on each other also remind one that such dependency is, at best, a necessary, not a sufficient, requisite for love.

b. Facilitative role interdependence: There have been systematic studies of five conditions which, in addition to diffuse dependency, might relate to the appearance of love. These are: facilitative role interdependence, trust and trustworthiness, approachability, similarity of interpersonal characteristics, and the willingness with which people engage in a relationship. These certainly are not independent phenomena, but an approach through each reveals distinctive preconditions for love. We begin with an experiment by Thomas (140).

Working with a population of 160 young women, all employees of a large private utility, Thomas established four types of experimental situations. In each type, his subjects were told that they were to work on a test of General Work Intelligence. Half of the subjects were told that they would be scored on the basis of their work as individuals; the others on the grounds of their performance as members of a small group. In turn, half the subjects in each of these two populations were placed in a situation in which every person was responsible for all aspects of the task; half in a setting in which each person was responsible for only a particular part of the enterprise.

For our interests, as for Thomas', the significant comparison between the experimental variation is that embodying

facilitative role interdependence in which people are scored on the basis of their joint performance and the task is divided up among them thus making the group's score dependent on their cooperation and coordination rather than simply on their performance as individuals. Comparing persons in this situation with those in the three remaining variations, Thomas found greater feelings of personal responsibility for the success of the enterprise, greater willingness to help others do their work, and a stronger attraction to the group. There was, moreover, greater speed of progress in completing the task.

Of equal importance were some negative relationships. Under facilitative role interdependence, subjects also showed greater anger toward others in their group and displayed feelings of restlessness and of being "hemmed in." Thomas, in the manner of French (63) before him, interprets these results as inherent consequences of close cooperation. He argues that the close coordination of activities gives rise to greater opportunity for people's getting in each other's way even as they facilitate one another's efforts. These frustrations provoke anger. Similarly, the close articulation of efforts affords less room for individuals to do what they might wish, when and as they might like, giving rise to the experience of being confined.

c. Trust and trustworthiness: Thomas' work generates or evokes responsible and cooperative conduct by providing a task requiring coordinated efforts for the joint attainment of a desired objective. Deutsch and his collaborators (43, 44, 45, 100, 128)

have sought to define a task and other conditions that lead persons to trust one another when there are dangers of exploitation or injury from collaboration. They assume that people will trust each other if they: 1) are committed to reach some goal and failure will cost more than they want to risk in an uncertain venture, 2) need each other's help and perceive one another as able to help, 3) perceive one another as similarly dependent, and 4) are each aware that this is their joint situation. Loomis (128) found that the greater the extent to which these several conditions were present, the greater was the likelihood that pairs of experimental subjects would trust each other in a situation involving risk and that the recipient of trust would prove trustworthy. In a second experimental manipulation, Deutsch showed that individuals are more likely to trust one another if they believe the other person has nothing to gain from untrustworthy behavior and if they perceive themselves as able to exert some control over the other person's outcomes.

Deutsch (43) also sought to learn whether certain orientations of his subjects were associated with trustfulness and trustworthiness. He reports that persons rated low on the California F Scale, indicating little tendency to be domineering or submissive, tend also to be trustful. Subjects who are themselves trustful are also more likely to be worthy of trust. Of particular interest is the finding that subjects whom the experimenter assigned a role of being trustful, prove trustworthy as well. This may indicate the presence of some fundamental behavioral or social incompatibility between assuming one of these orientations and not the other.

Where time and opportunities do not permit assessments of a situation and dangers from collaboration are likely, trust may nonetheless be required for work to proceed. Cohen (35) suggests that certain ritual gestures come into existence to provide rough and ready tests of trustworthiness under these conditions. The hand salute of modern armies may, he says, have appeared to indicate that the soldier approaching an officer was not concealing a knife in his palm. Knights approaching another horseman indicated trust by opening their visors and thus weakening their defenses. Cohen interprets the rituals of the manual of arms as an especially vivid and subtle test of trustworthiness. Believing that inter-status hostilities between officers and men are likely to be strong and concealed in modern military organizations, he views the rule requiring whole-hearted deference of a man toward the officer who inspects his weapon as an institutionalized denial of aggressive intent. He thinks it significant that when troops are in contact with an enemy and, presumably their hostility is vented on the foe, officers dispense with these and related rituals. Cohen finds similar patterns in the stylized etiquette of inter-racial contacts in the American South.

d. Approachability: There is evidence that people who want and seek intimate relations with others tend to have them (73, 93, 153). They approach others and are approachable.

In this connection, Blau (24) has made an interesting proposal. He suggests that, "the more attractive a person's impressive qualities make him appear to the others in a group,

the more reluctant will they be, at least initially, to approach him freely and to draw him into friendly social intercourse." He believes that several considerations support this position: 1) the attractive person may hurt us by rejecting our overtures; 2) his very attractiveness threatens the relative popularity of all others in the group; 3) an approach to such a person may make him still more attractive in his own eyes and those of others, thus further increasing the first two dangers. If, however, the attractive person makes himself approachable by volunteering information about personal weaknesses, or if by referring to similarities between his background and experience and those of other members, he indicates that he seeks standing as a peer, not a superior, he can be integrated into the group. As Blau summarizes:

If group members are classified on the basis of two attributes, common sense would lead us to expect that those with two positive qualities have the greatest chance of being accepted by their peers, and those with two negative qualities, the least chance. In contrast, the theory implies that the members who are positive on the more salient attribute (and hence attractive) and negative on the less salient one (and hence also approachable) are the most likely to win the acceptance of their peers. And the members who are negative on the more salient but positive on the less salient attribute are expected to be least likely to be integrated.

Blau himself was able to present only fragmentary data providing an indirect test of his proposal. Although the findings are in the direction expected, more cases, better indices, and greater control of other variables would be required to conclude that Blau's proposition had been given a fair evaluation.

In a study by Gross (77) we do, however, have data important for a simpler proposition concerning approachability.

Gross puts the matter this way:

...every cohesive group strikes a bargain with its members: It accepts him if he will be approachable, and he, in turn, agrees to be approachable if guaranteed that nothing he reveals will be used against him....

From this reasoning, Gross concludes that social intimacy will appear only between persons who are not competitors. This condition is satisfied if there is, inherently, no competition in a relationship or if participants can artificially obliterate an existing state of competition. Examining 11 informal groups of friends (ranging from 2 to 6 members) in the head office of a wholesale manufacturing and mail-order firm, Gross found that in "every informal group, not one member was a competitor of any other member in it." (In this case he was defining competition as the performance of similar kinds of work or employment under the same supervisor.) He proposes that, when intimate groups arise among competitors, as among manual workers in factories, their appearance is made possible only because their members have imposed effective limits on each other's productivity, thus eliminating competition.

e. Similarity of personal characteristics: It has often been argued that love is most likely to arise in a population with homogeneous characteristics. The rationales to support this position are two: 1) people can relate in a diffuse and intimate manner only if they share many understandings in common and 2) people with

common tastes and objectives are more likely to find one another attractive. The counter argument is that, to love one another, people must find in their fellows qualities or services they themselves lack and want and which can be acquired by association.

The largest body of systematic data invoked to support the first approach concerns mutual friends. As a recent survey of this large literature concludes (47), mutual friends are almost always shown to be alike in social attitudes, aesthetic and avocational tastes, and level of intelligence. Similar observations appear in comparisons of husbands and their wives, buttressed, in their case, by great homogeneity of demographic characteristics. Moving to much larger social units, we have Angell's (5) discovery that, in American cities of more than 100,000 population, homogeneity of the citizens with respect to social class, race, and ethnic origin is positively associated with their rate, per capita, of contributions to community welfare and negatively with the rate of crime.

Winch (155), on the other hand, has published a pioneering investigation which purports to show that members of a married pair, whatever their homogeneity in values, ability, and social background, are likely to be opposite but complementary in temperament and in the character of their participation in interpersonal relations. He proposes, in short, that husbands and wives tend to be alike in objectives and abilities, but to differ in their characteristic contributions toward utilizing those abilities and achieving those goals. Data obtained from 24 married couples, all students at Northwestern University, afford some support for his contention, especially in the finding that spouses are likely to complement each other with respect to dominance and submissiveness.

There seems, however, no gain in continuing to treat these issues in the simple terms conventionally employed. It is evident from everyday experience that "birds of a feather flock together" and that "opposites attract." What needs to be done, and has not been done, is to specify the conditions under which one or both or neither are true. Winch deserves particular credit for taking the furthest step in that direction.

f. Willingness: At the beginning of our survey, we found that a criterion of genuine love was the willingness of participants to undertake it. Thibaut and Riecken (139) have isolated one important condition associated with the judgment that a man has acted of his own free will: his social status. In each of two matched laboratory experiments, they found that subjects believed that high status collaborators acted as they did from personal desires; low status collaborators in response to external pressures. (The "collaborators" were, in fact, confederates of the experimenter and their interaction with the subjects was carefully standardized to make them alike except for certain alleged background factors such as having graduated from a high school of high or low prestige.)

The investigators report a second finding of interest. Some subjects saw the low status collaborator as acting freely; some viewed the high status collaborator as coerced by events. If one controls for the collaborators' status, he discovers that, from the beginning of the experiment, subjects like, admire, and accept a man they believe to be acting of his own free will and like him even more at the end of their work together.

2. Search and selection: If people happen to be thrown together with others who are attractive and approachable, or engaged with them in facilitative interaction so safeguarded that trustfulness is justified and willingness evident, love may flourish without much further effort. It often happens, however, that individuals must seek out the love or the beloved they need. This may entail a long search and difficult choices, depending on the alternatives available and the character of a person's desires.

A search of this kind by a thoughtful girl, hiding with her family and some neighbors from German persecution, is the principal theme of Anne Frank's diary (61). Her experience is especially revealing, not because her hopes or desires were unusual, but because the persons who might have helped with them were drastically limited in number and, for various reasons, unsuited to the task.

Anne was on the verge of adolescence. She also was unusually perceptive of meanings in human relations. She wanted to explore the values around which a worthy adult life might be organized. She wanted to evaluate and control her own selfishness, her disgust with the compromised standards of adults, her ambivalence toward her mother, and her varied feelings about sexuality. She wanted to express and clarify sentiments that were variously bizarre, grandiose, highly idealistic, superficial, earthy, or harsh. Trying to establish an appropriate friendship with each of the others in hiding with her, she slowly came to realize that each had interests or responsibilities that made him unsuitable. Anne was already at odds with her mother. The adults in neighboring families were

insensitive and egocentric. Margot, her older sister, proved helpful for a time, but, as their relation deepened, broke it off to protect her specially favored place in their mother's esteem. Peter, the adolescent son of a neighbor's family, was more concerned with endearments and sexual explorations than serious discussions of Anne's inner self. Finally there was her perceptive and loving father. It seemed for a time that here was the friend she sought. Then Albert Frank's responsibilities to his wife and older daughter and his duty as a parent who corrected, disciplined, and taught Anne precluded his becoming her intimate friend, her co-conspirator, and someone who could freely exchange fantasies, ambitions, and dislikes.

Everyone around Anne was capable of love; was, in fact, giving it, seeking it, and receiving it. But none of them could provide love for the purposes Anne required, legitimate though those objectives were, without seriously compromising other important obligations.

The friend Anne sought, and might well have found in some other girl of her age had she lived under normal conditions, would have been a person highly gratified by Anne's being all her many selves, a person without conflicting commitments. This friend would almost certainly have been somewhat removed from Anne's ordinary round of life; not her superior or subordinate, her competitor or someone mutually responsible with her for some common enterprise. That friend would be a person whom she could neither threaten nor fail by being herself.

A search for someone who can give the love one needs is a part of dating and courtship, of the choice of an advisor, counselor, clergyman, therapist, or faith, of affiliation with voluntary associations, an employing company, and with political figures and parties. Aristotle's (6) judgment that persons capable of skillful, complete love are rare, corresponds to what is known concerning the distribution of such component skills as empathy, ego-strength, insight, self-discipline, and devotion to the welfare of others. It is not the whole story.

To nourish a man adequately in one respect commonly prevents our aiding him in others. To support his most penetrating explorations of self requires a suitable social role as well as interpersonal competence, and this role may prevent the offering of other kinds of love. For example, Albert Frank could not have supported Anne in such a venture and also provided her with the fatherly care she required. There is, in short, no perfect lover, no complete friend, and persons who supply a man with one kind of love should be socially removed from those who supply other kinds.

As a consequence, most people obtain love from a variety of sources for a variety of purposes. This means that, other things being equal, the number and diversity of a man's social contacts increase the likelihood of his getting the love he desires.

Such contacts are not distributed at random in the population. Membership in formal, voluntary groups such as churches, unions, fraternal organizations, sports clubs, and neighborhood associations is strongly and positively related to socio-economic

position (9, 62, 118, 123, 152, 157). One large scale investigation found that, with the population's demographic characteristics and the distance of their residence from the city's center controlled, such membership is greater in the city than in its suburbs (158).

Although the relationship is not as spectacular, such informal associations as those with friends, co-workers, relatives, and neighbors also are often reported to be positively and significantly associated with socio-economic status (9, 18, 126, 127). With status controlled, these informal contacts have been found in positive association with a number of memberships in formal organizations (9, 152). The number and/or intensity of such contacts is further related to longer residence in one's present neighborhood (109, 127), belonging to a large family (109), being married but without children or being the parent of more than one child (123), having experienced regular advances in one general type of occupation (141), being identified with the community (54), being a woman (153), being young (153), living in an urban community (116), desiring upward social mobility (102), and having an income and education consistent with the prestige afforded by one's ethnic background (92). The desire for such informal contacts is associated with inhibiting or controlling one's behavior to provide satisfaction for others (66) and seems to be a generalized characteristic of individuals (73, 153).

Whether needs for love are differently satisfied as a consequence of this uneven distribution of certain potential sources, we do not know. If, however, one is right in thinking that the loves men need must come from specialized and separated sources, each

individual is left with the difficult task of integrating his experiences into a coherent style of life. (Indeed, the specialized loves he receives may only nourish expectations and potencies that the individual cannot bring together in a mutually compatible whole. To take one example, the nurturance by colleagues of one another's professional skills and tastes may exacerbate the conflict between their careers and their roles as husbands and fathers.)

Involvement in a social order whose norms embrace the whole of the individual's life career and which provide him with criteria for the evaluation and reconciliation of his specialized experiences seems to be a precondition for his development of personal coherence (48). If no embracive normative or institutional framework is experienced as real or valid or worthy, all the specialized loves lose their meaning and worth (48, 141). Then, in Sartre's words, man's condition is one of anguish. There is no information about the frequency with which given individuals experience this kind of despair during their careers or its incidence or intensity in any society. Some psychotherapists and social observers believe it is on the rise in post-industrial societies and efforts to cope with its presence are the great objective of a new school of practitioners, the existential psychotherapists (105).

As the person in need seeks love, many people, often the same ones, search for someone they may love. The task is to establish the relevance of others' needs for one's love and their capacity to accept and use it.

It is frequent in such assessments that love must be given before its relevance can be fully judged. If the subjects have little present capacity to use it, they must be able at least to receive it, and every assurance must be provided that it is given freely and for the recipients' sake to be what they are and what, in freedom and integrity, they may become. Thus it is standard practice in therapeutic institutions for badly traumatized children to provide a full larder, its contents available whenever the child wants to eat; unlocked doors that permit him to explore or withdraw as he will; extremely considerate handling of wakening and going to sleep; a tolerance for his display of symptoms limited only by the requirement that he not destroy essential property nor make physical attacks on the staff (19, 114, 115). If the child becomes incapable of handling even these limits, he is removed gently from the situation, accompanied by an adult who waits with him until he becomes calm. Simultaneously, his ability for action and decision is encouraged through enterprises such as team games and free art in which he can take some initiative without being threatened by pressures to compete or choose as an individual.

But such institutions do not take all disturbed children. They usually admit only those of at least normal intelligence and physical health, those who are neither too withdrawn or too troubled by pathological suspicion of their peers. They also seek youngsters who are similar to one another in cultural background. These restrictions assure a clientele which can learn new styles of conduct, receive and use the kind of love offered under the conditions through

which it is provided, and communicate readily with each other and with the staff.

In varying degree, as fits particular situations, these four features--the granting of love, the acceptance of the person for what he is including his unloveable characteristics, the setting of limits within which love is exercised, and the determination of probable capacity to receive and use love for his enhancement--are employed in establishing a loving relationship. Friendships and courtships, for example, often have their rudimentary beginnings in some special kindness beyond the requirements of formal social obligation, progressing, perhaps to the sharing of small confidences and to the acceptance of joking and teasing which indicate that the other person is desired even when he proves prickly. Occasions may be created in which each can move toward greater intimacy or, gracefully, keep the relation as it is (146). All these initial steps must be taken with delicacy or too much may seem promised and graceful withdrawal made impossible.

Judgments of the quantity of love that can be accepted, even by one who needs it, pose subtle problems. An offer of great love may frighten or may raise intolerable guilt. Similarly, the support offered must be usable for the beloved's particular enterprises or it may be seen as competitive with them or as exploitative. Thus Litwak, Count, and Hayden (99) present findings which suggest that the exercise by a wife of creative social sensitivity in areas where her husband feels he should excel is associated with less satisfaction in marriage for both of them.

3. The scope of love: The forms of love vary in their scope from the almost limitless obligations entailed in love for God or a close friend to the circumscribed commitments of a physician or attorney to his client. Wherever something of love appears, there are delicate problems of setting its scope. These problems arise because, in love, the extent of responsibility is inherently vague, and because the genuineness of professed love is so difficult to determine.

The work of love cannot go on within clearly defined boundaries. Even in the relatively limited relationship between professional and client the obligation is one of creating a general state of affairs in which growth can occur. The doctor or attorney who lacked a general understanding of his client as a person and of the man's affairs would be ill informed to render competent service. The facts most relevant for diagnosis and prescription may lie far afield from the client's "presenting symptoms" and must be sought. To permit such a search the client must trust his counselor's judgment of what is relevant and accept the obligation to give fully and accurately what information is required of him. The professional, too, is obliged to extend trust. He must respect his client's integrity and speak candidly of his judgment of the client's situation, keep in confidence the information the client provides, and be guided solely by the client's general interests. He must inform the client of considerations which that person may not have foreseen, even if these will shorten or terminate his need for professional services. Where mutual obligations are presumed to be

without limit, as in a close friendship, the suggestion of reservations or boundaries threatens the relationship even more.

What, then, if the friend or client seeks to define certain vital matters as off limits or if either makes demands that go beyond the relationship's boundaries? How, short of terminating the relationship, may its necessary indeterminateness be preserved while suggesting the presence of limits?

Perhaps the most common strategy to counter excessive expectations is tactful but persistent refusal to deal directly with those demands, not defining them as unrealistic or an imposition and not acceding to them. This appears most likely of success if accompanied by unobtrusive but clear evidence of making some special effort in matters that come legitimately within the relationship's scope.

Clark (34) describes this procedure, developed to a self-conscious technique, in the junior colleges, the so-called "open-door" colleges, where many students ill equipped for advanced studies must be given the opportunity to develop their intellectual skills at their own pace and as fully as they can in the hope of eventual success, a task in which large numbers will fail. The college counselor must keep open the door to further attempts, seeking always for some legitimate means by which the student may achieve his goals, yet must keep him aware of the real state of his present achievements. To this end, the counselor devotes endless time, effort, and ingenuity to aiding a failing student overcome personal difficulties that impede his progress, always confronts him with the

continuous measures of his performance, but never says directly that the cause is hopeless or success likely. By thus giving of himself beyond what seem to be the formal requirements of his office, the counselor testifies to the depth and sincerity of his commitments while defining, indirectly, the limits to their scope.

We should notice that the counselor's approach succeeds because it employs yet another criterion of love and because the environing society defines that criterion as a limit to the demands men may make on one another. Genuine love, as we saw earlier, is a commitment to nourish the powers, independence, and integration of another; to enrich another in these respects, not just to maintain him as he is. To fulfill this objective, the one who receives love must show greater potency in dealing with the environment and with himself; increased powers in defining objectives and obtaining and utilizing resources from that environment. Movement toward these accomplishments provides a standard governing lover and loved alike, limiting as well as describing their mutual responsibilities. Under this standard, the friend or parent or spouse is, like the professional, limited to practicing within his competence and governing his conduct by its relevance for enhancing the person he loves. Under the same standard, the person loved is obligated to use the support received for growth and to respect the integrity and independence of the person or institution that nourishes him (21, 112).

Because those who give love and those who receive it often violate this standard and are, themselves, unwilling or unable to implement it, or are ignorant of the consequences of its violation, a variety of sanctions are routinely employed in its support. There is always the threat, inherent in the situation, that the relationship will be broken off, or, if continued, that it will fail

of its purpose, pressing needs going unsatisfied. There are the continued costs of attending college or paying the professional or spending time with the friend which go for nothing if the relationship is unproductive. There are evaluations by supervisors, kinsmen, acquaintances, teachers, and other friends.

Where these indirect and informal sanctions fail, agencies of government or of professional groups may take formal action. The difficulty in applying formal sanctions is that they can govern successfully only the performance of reasonable specific and objective acts, not the multiplicity of subtle, almost intangible judgments and behaviors required for a life of love. Even here, however, special controls have been devised, although generally with no understanding of their real effectiveness. Catechisms, lists of questions for self-examination before confession or communion, professional seminars concerned with desirable practice, and instruction in the meaning of the ethical code governing one's occupation are routinized methods for training in love and for the reinforcement of standards learned in the past. Monastic orders have one or more officers in each chapter house required to examine and guide members at regular intervals concerning the great and small details of their conduct. Some orders also make it the responsibility of each member to provide the chapter's director with detailed reports concerning the spiritual development of their fellows. Patients in psychotherapy and prisoners in group reorientation sessions have been trained or retrained in the nuances of responsible behavior by means of a detailed examination of their successes and failures in social life (22, 147, 154).

One group of social scientists has taught decision-making committees to employ a related device when they reach an impasse (97). The members sit back and soliloquize aloud, reflecting with great candor on their view of the difficulty including observations concerning each other's personalities and rectitude.

B. Maintenance and Development

Once begun, love may or may not be sustained. It will not persist or grow without special effort. There are at least four activities concerning which difficulties are likely to appear. These are: 1) efforts to differentiate a primary association from other relations in which people engage, 2) efforts to conduct necessary relations with the environment outside the primary relationship, 3) efforts to manage the internal routines of giving love and receiving it, and 4) efforts to guide individual participants' careers in love.

1. Differentiating a primary relationship from other associations:

In comradeship men are beside each other, jointly confronting their common task. In love, men are face to face, their relationship itself the focus of attention. The outer world is a source of support or interference, but not the occasion for their union. Each person attracts the other to himself, not merely to his works. The more diffuse their obligations for one another, the more are they oriented inward toward their own interaction.

All human organizations requiring large commitments from their participants try to encapsulate their members' lives, eliminating potential sources of seduction and subversion. The more intense forms of love are among these. The cloister guards its members' loyalty by

removing them physically from contacts with the world outside, by absorbing all of their time in a predetermined round of life, by immersing them in a special task and language and dress (10, 31, 83, 84, 138, 156). It guards also against the development of competing loyalties within the organization (10, pp. 112-113, 31, p. 203). Close friendships may be forbidden. The new member may be required to eat, sleep, worship, and work always between the person who preceded him in membership in the order and the one who happened to follow (10).

Many other groups guard their members' love against comparable seductions whether from outside the organization or from within it. Thus law, custom, and the routines of life shield a married couple from easy opportunities for unfaithfulness. In ordinary life, as in the cloister, social restrictions on looking, listening, bodily posture, movement, dress, and speech focus conduct in approved channels and block forbidden paths. Cliques within families are discouraged by the precept that parents give equal treatment to each of their children.

College fraternities and sororities also deter the rise of special friendships and intimate cliques within their memberships. The following are excerpts from descriptions which members have written for me of fraternity practices at The University of Michigan:

It is considered poor form for one active to sit at the same table very often.

About four men are "on" a rushee the entire time he is in the house. When another active joins a group consisting of four men one active drops out and switches to an undermanned group. It is the duty of every active to meet or observe the rushee before he is bid. This system is slower in bidding than some others...[but it] tends to prevent a fraction of the house that has developed from perpetuating itself.

A whole society is sometimes defined as a community of intense love with the consequence that special attachments to more limited groups are discouraged. Thus, speaking of an ideal Chinese mother, the Red Flag Literary and Art Critique Group of Peking University says (101):

She loved her sons in the same way as **she** loved the 650 million people [of] China.... In the Communist society...maternal love...will be cut loose completely from the ideological influence of private ownership.

There are, however, special reasons why love is a relationship closed to influences from without. The first is that, in love, the focus of attention is on developing a relationship with one's fellow participants. This distinguishes it from any enterprise in which the objective is to modify the outer world, and the social relationship, as such, is only a means to this external end, evaluated by its efficiency for that purpose.

Second, if love is authentic, it is aimed at the enhancement of participants relative to their own needs and potentialities. The standard of enhancement or growth is not what someone else has accomplished. The nature of the participants' needs and possibilities

define the relation's productivity and their advance. To judge their growth by some other standards may be necessary, but it is not love. As a consequence, it becomes necessary to avoid situations and contacts with the outer world that might involve such judgments. Each monk is defined as striving to enlarge his own abilities to love God; not to match the abilities of someone else. Husbands and wives are encouraged to do more for each other than they have and to aim at doing all they can; not to equal the other's performance.

Again, the work of love deals with people as they really are and, to proceed, they must be free to be what they are. By definition, this means that many of the parts they play in life must be dropped (68) revealing private and central aspects of their selves. The deeper the love given and accepted, the more are people vulnerable to one another. It is inescapable that, as the popular song has it, "you always hurt the one you love." Because heightened vulnerability makes such traumatic incidents almost inevitable, even though quite unintended, forbearance, patience, contrition, and forgiveness are a required part of successful loving. The working through of all these relations require somewhat private surroundings.

Complementing these needs for privacy is the seemingly universal social norm that any legitimate instance of love has the right to privacy (106, 125). The state may define conversations between a professional man and his client as privileged. Spouses cannot be called to testify against each other in court. The house of a blood brother is a legitimate sanctuary for a man fleeing from tribal justice, however heinous his crime. Relatives are discouraged

from prying into the affairs of a married couple; outsiders from disturbing the communion of friends. Friends and monks are forbidden to tattle about each other (31, 131, 133, 143, 149).

A peculiar feature of the economics of love also militates against its ready accessibility to outside influences. The source of gain in love is from a relation to someone else as a person. Other things equal, the degree of such intimacy between an original pair declines in the presence of a third person. The former members come under constraints to compete with each other for the newcomer's devotion and with him for each other (24). Impersonality grows.

But some primary relationships are certain to expand in membership, others are likely to do so. The common solution is to define the essential relation as that of each member to the "spirit" or "personality" or "character" of the group as a whole which is said to benefit each participant equally according to his need. New members are defined as increasing the group's resources in excess of the costs they lay upon it, thus enhancing its potential contribution to each of its members. This will often be expressed symbolically by elaborating the symbols, practices, rituals, and terms that represent the whole group and its potency. It is now the individual as a member of this increasingly complex and powerful group that is loved, not the individual as a unique person. The group, or its representative--the Pope, the General, the President, the parents, the Abbott, the chief therapist--is then said to love each member equally (64).

I have sketched four special considerations that operate to shield a primary relationship from the influence of its environing world: the focus on the development of the relationship itself, the avoidance of standards of accomplishment unrelated to the needs and potentialities of its own members, the provision of privacy in which participants need not fear to be themselves, and the protection of deep intimacy against dilution from impersonality. A fifth should be added: A primary relationship requires considerable "local autonomy" because it embodies responsible action.

Loving nurturance, we found, must be responsible. Responsible action, in turn, is impossible without the freedom to allocate resources and make choices which one is committed to pursue. Successful love is impossible without responsibility and responsibility is impossible without considerable autonomy of action.

2. Conducting necessary relations with the outer environment:

"Love," says Bettelheim's memorable title, "is not enough" (19). It supplies some, not all, of man's needs. Its actualization and maintenance require that skills, standards, and resources be brought from without into the loving relationship.

There is no way for lovers to avoid immersion in the world beyond their circle, no way even for their love to flourish apart from that wider environment. Love is not the whole of human life. As people devote more and more of their relationship to loving, they are ever less capable of employing it to provide other requirements for life and must obtain them elsewhere. In sum, loving is not self supporting.

As we have seen, the objective of genuine love is to increase the participants' powers as self-conscious, discriminating beings--as persons. Those powers are exercised in many enterprises in addition to love and a primary relationship's relevance for the problems posed by that outer world is one essential test of its worth. It is, we say, unhealthy to continue a love which fails this test. Love means greater, more effective involvement in the world, not less.

Requirements for love's fruition through performance in the world outside, have long been recognized as important safeguards against certain pathologies which otherwise would go uncorrected. It is, to take an instance, all too easy for the members of a group to fall in love with loving, making of their mutual devotion an ultimate goal and fearing to disrupt their beatific relationship by solving problems. When this occurs, difficulties and deficiencies are papered over for the sake of harmony until the point is reached at which they cannot be ignored and the group's integration cannot bear their cumulative weight.

Again, love is a diffuse relationship. Without the criteria provided by particular tasks which need attention, objective, rational standards to govern the relationship would be difficult to define and maintain, including those which test love's genuineness and appropriateness.

Then there is the dilemma that the very tendencies of loving toward privacy make it suspect in the larger society (70). Are the lovers developing standards that subvert other groups? Service in

the outer world prevents the rise of such interpretations and affords a test, for lovers, of the likely viability of any novel standards emerging among them.

There is support for the further judgment that primary relations are undependable unless some more embracing external organization to which all participants adhere may legitimately and effectively enforce compliance with standards of love and respect (71). Blau's (23) study of a social agency provides an example. He found that the social workers most dedicated to helping their clients were also least willing to allow others to provide those clients with certain special services. He also discovered, however, that the more of such especially dedicated workers there were in a given unit of the agency, the more each was willing to allow another, and more appropriate, person to provide specialized services for clients. Blau attributes this "structural effect" to the development, when several client-oriented workers interact, of norms concerning what is in the clients' best interest regardless of the satisfactions afforded the individual members of the agency staff.

There also is evidence that intimate and diffuse associations in the absence of such embracing external controls are often characterized by extreme and "irrational" hatred. Thus, accompanying the intimate, informal groups which rise in the interstices of large organizations is the dislike and persecution by their members of workers who belong to none of them. Banfield (12) found that diffuse intimacy unsupervised by larger institutional standards was accompanied by deep suspicion within and between families of an isolated

village in southern Italy. Several reports have linked such close but uncontrolled associations with the prevalence of witchcraft among primitive peoples (135).

There seem to be no examples of groups devoted primarily to love which also succeeded in closing themselves off from the outer environment. Hostility from the larger social order, the groups' lack of self-sufficiency, and their internal stresses and contradictions unmitigated by outside controls have routinely destroyed utopian communities, isolated monasteries, romantic social movements (16), and the like.

There are, on the other hand, some conditions under which such groups can maintain their integrity while in contact with the larger society. They can operate successfully if they can obtain needed resources without participation in the outer world in ways which would vitiate their inner organization. Sometimes, as in the case of monastic orders or approved friendships, other groups freely provide the required supplies, gifts, and, apart from certain clearly delimited types of supervision (31, pp. 216-229), honor the primary group's privacy in its internal affairs. Sometimes, as in the case of juvenile gangs, necessary resources can be seized without the members' becoming involved in the production of those resources. Again, primary groups may be able to obtain support by performing for the outer world activities that are natural expressions of their members' mutual devotion--the teaching or social service of monks and nuns, the business enterprise of the Calvinist merchant, or the propaganda or intelligence activities of the dedicated Communist.

If intimate and informal relations with competing external groups are inescapable, the employment of banter, irony, and polite fictions allows the association to occur while controlling its effects (30).

To use banter is to play at being hostile, distant, unfriendly, while intimating friendliness. It is a style of interaction used when two roles are presented to an individual and he decides to retain the status appropriate to both, while, as he must, acting out the role of only one. ...the relationship with the group dominant at the occasion of interaction is retained; it is the other relationship which bears the episode of banter, as of less social significance at the time but...requiring safeguard for the future. ...it is almost impossible to behave in any other way in messrooms and canteens.

* * * * *

There are other occasions when...a primary status membership of a socially dominant group is threatened by the simultaneous presentation of an alternative, secondary status membership, which on its side is not valuable enough to be safeguarded. However, simple rejection of a relationship is damaging to the primary status, implying a disregard for values which is dangerous to the esteem structure in which the primary status is located.... To use irony is to play at being friendly--at maintaining a member-relationship--while intimating enmity, rejection.

* * * * *

In addition...there exist...polite fictions. The arrangements are in general directed toward the exclusion from the terms of interaction of any status occupied by a participant which is incompatible with the establishment of the consensus necessary....

3. Managing internal routines: The origin and conduct of all human associations require that men be somewhat different from one another. People come together because they need each other to provide what none can supply for himself. They may have different kinds or amounts

of skill or resources, but they must differ at least in that one has what the other needs and lacks.

Once together, participants must become different in certain additional respects in order to share their respective resources. As Bales (11) points out, there is some measure of specialization among men in every conversation, for, in the nature of the case, they do not repeat each other's words, but elaborate, evaluate, question, or otherwise respond to what was said. They also divide up the use of such facilities as time and space, each becoming different from the others with respect to the particular share available to him.

It is a long distance, but one without discontinuity, from these microscopic forms of social differentiation to the massive, clearly marked division of labor in complex societies. In groups of all sizes we find differentiation in its two forms--in "specialization" which refers to the nature or source of the influence that men exert, and in "stratification" comprised by variations in the amount of social influence.

Whether in the form of specialization or stratification, differences among men are as necessary a means for the conduct of love as for any other instance of social interaction. Such differences are also potentially subversive of the particular kind of social interaction that love represents. We have seen that loving involves a considerable equality among participants. Differentiation is a condition which commonly represents inequality. Loving is directed toward the enhancement of others. The coordination of differentiated activities may be so time-consuming that it becomes

an end in itself rather than a means to love. Loving requires intimacy. Specialization and stratification generate differences in interest and commitment within a group and embody a degree of social distance among members. Because these alien forces become ever more conspicuous and significant as organizational complexity increases, they are always the subject of compensatory actions by larger groups seeking to cultivate love (123).

One such compensatory action is the refusal to vest specialized activities in the individuals who perform them. Groups may, for example, employ a system of rotation such that a particular specialized task is always performed but is executed by a given individual on a temporary basis only--a system of "taking turns." Speaking of experience with this practice in a kibbutz, Spiro (129) notes that it could not be employed rigorously because only from 12 to 15 persons possessed certain skills vital to the community's life. Etzioni's (53) study of collective settlements in Israel produces a similar conclusion.

Nevertheless, great and costly efforts may be made to rotate personnel through jobs. Although frequently disruptive of a house, fraternity presidents are often elected for terms of only six months and limited to one term in office. Baldwin (10) says that rotation sometimes resulted in dangerous incompetence in the cloister. When, however, a nun protested that she lacked training to act as a pharmacist, drycleaner, or cook, she was told that God would provide the strength and talent necessary.

When stratification presents a special treat, it, too, can be curbed by distinguishing between the individual and the authority he wields. Authority and control of all essential resources may be lodged in the whole group, and the leader required to consult with the group, seeking to express their consensus rather than to develop a personal policy. We find this practice in many primitive societies, in religious and academic bodies, and in the advice of group dynam-icists that decision-making conferences restrict the power of leaders to the facilitation of procedures for making decisions while reserving all control of policy to the whole group (31, 97, 134). Frequently, in these same settings, there is a formal rule that all decisions are tentative, subject to review and modification by the group as changing needs require.

Even more drastic measures have been taken in some primary groups. The group may delegate responsibility but not power. It is quite likely to prohibit members from obtaining special benefits for themselves or their friends from offices they hold. Thus the Mother Abbess must live as simply as any other nun and do nothing which would show favoritism or lead to her personal gratification (10, 83). Her Sisters give special deference to her office, not to the woman who occupies it. The general manager of the kibbutz is not the social superior of the cleaner of latrines (129, p. 24).

There also are some actions which embody equality and humility and which may be required of all members, however exalted their office. The Abbott and Abbess periodically move about their communities kneeling before each member and washing his feet. All

staff members of therapeutic homes are expected to be available for informal, individualized relations with their patients (19). Friendly but irreverent lampooning of authority, offices, and office-holders may be a regular part of life in a kibbutz or fraternity or family. In organizations like the cloister or kibbutz where moral fervor is likely to be high, these periods are especially important safeguards against temptations to self-righteousness, pontification, cant, and perfectionism.

Finally, when possible, differentiation is avoided. The more integrated chapters of college fraternities entertain guests by means of group games rather than performances by individuals. All the members sing together or circulate around the room. Team play rather than individual competition is encouraged.

4. Guiding the careers of individuals: All these efforts to preserve equality do not mean that there are no careers in loving, no socially acknowledged stages in an individual's developing skill, no routinized measures of his progress. Without these it would be difficult for him to guide his conduct, to judge his competence, and to formulate plans for future development.

There are such stages, marked with special clarity in the larger, more persistent associations devoted to love, but absent from none. Figures like the saint or the elder statesman or the beloved neighbor mark upper extremes. Increases in privileges, responsibilities, and the holding of offices occasionally indicate intermediate steps. But the marks of advancement in love stress features absent from, or less conspicuous in, other types of careers.

Growth in love is an increased immersion in, and dedication to, a relationship with others, an increased integration with others. Saints, good neighbors, and the like differ from their fellows, not in the nature of their interests, but in their embodiment of concerns shared equally by all. Nuns who specialize in obedience or poverty are not turning from other believers but are especially thorough in eliminating those aspects of their behavior which separate them from others. The Mother Superior is an administrator not primarily because she possesses skills relevant for administration, but, at least in theory, because she is more perfect in devotion than her subordinates. This type of perfection, and only it, is the legitimate basis for her greater power in the cloister, and it is power to be used for the whole cloister's benefit, not her own. Indeed, as we have seen, her way of life is otherwise to be like that of the humblest novice.

Seniority seems to be employed universally as a means for distinguishing stages in love. On the one hand it is a rough index of the number of contributions a man has made and separates those who are more experienced from others. At the same time, seniority makes these distinctions by means of a criterion, years in service, which all can achieve and which preserves equal status among age-mates by not registering differences in the character or importance of their services. Students in fraternities and sororities often receive a membership number indicating the order in which they were pledged. Members are then given their choice of rooms in accordance with length of membership. One student observes:

The use of sigma numbers is necessary in many instances other than room allocation. ...the president couldn't settle the disputes; it would give him too much power. The chapter couldn't vote on some matters since this would ...split the group. Also it would be too time consuming.

When the career is officially recognized, the stages mentioned are in terms of years of service to the group or unusual contributions to it. Celebrations of a career may involve gifts to the institution and much will be said of the genius of the group in recruiting and training this human instrument. If gifts are given the individual himself, they are likely to be of the sort that promote further his services to the group--a new prayer book, money to support a favorite charity.

Because the objective of loving is the enhancement of another, not personal aggrandizement, the appropriate measure of success must be a man's contribution, not his own gains. One does not set out to be a saint or a great benefactor of mankind or a superb patriot and to do so would preclude achieving one's end. One would be exploiting the needs of others for personal benefit and so precluding the growth of love. One can succeed only by setting out to serve, not to gain for himself. It would, consequently, be grossly inappropriate to recognize growth in love by a gift that would benefit the lover in particular apart from the causes to which he is devoted. The most appropriate gift will be one that furthers those causes or allows him to contribute to them more fully and effectively or that displays, by some special growth

of the beloved, the efficacy of his efforts in the past. The retiring professor is suitably honored by a festschrift displaying his students' best talents or an endowment to support his favorite scholarly programs. The parent is honored appropriately by mementos of his children's growing competence.

Although a career in love occurs through time, the career itself has a cyclical form. One changes by becoming more fully what one has been but never completely what one might be. The career is the elaboration and perfection of a single style of life, not the exploration of various styles. One's skills and outlook may be applied to many diverse tasks, but the general character of their objective is the same in each and the mechanisms by which their work is accomplished are essentially constant. It could scarcely be otherwise. Here, at the heart of social interaction, are the relationships on which all special forms of human association depend. As with any highly general principles, however varied their applications, the possibilities for employing these foundational skills are never fully exhausted nor is the need for their exercise outgrown. There is a constant venturing forth from these principles, a continuous reference back to them for guidance, and, when one enterprise is finished, a return to them as preparation for tasks to come (11, pp. 30-84).

There are, however, other aspects of an individual's career in loving. He becomes irritated. He wants to withdraw and pursue other activities. He finds increasing involvement frightening as well as fulfilling. Social arrangements must be provided if these periods of stress are to remain within bounds.

In larger organizations it becomes necessary to insure that love will be embodied in interpersonal relations despite the inability of participants to spend large amounts of time adapting to each other individually. Sincere expressions of repentance, restitution, forgiveness, and reconciliation cannot wait upon the gradual readjustment of personal feelings and must be routinized. Cloistered religious orders sometimes have the rule that, when two members have a falling out, the younger must apologize to the older and the older grant immediate and complete forgiveness. It also is common that the norms of such institutions define annoying habits of one's fellows as great blessings, for, in learning to love them despite those irritations, one grows more like God who can love the utterly unloveable. Some college fraternities require feuding members to work together on a project that benefits the whole group, especially a project that represents the group to the larger campus community, thus forcing them to submerge their personal differences in their common aspirations. Collective settlements may give persons with persistent grievances some special responsibilities for the care of their opponents' families or livestock.

It is difficult, however, for participants in love to tolerate the withdrawal of their members because withdrawal indicates the existence of interests apart from their mutual concerns and, possibly, some reassessment of the value of those concerns. It is, in fact, typical that the more formal primary groups have a rule making continuous participation an obligation as well as a privilege and refuse readmission to a person who once rejects his membership.

Members of a kibbutz who seek more privacy are thought queer. The ultimate criterion of a good high school, kindergarten, or kibbutz is whether it is a group characterized by intimacy of interaction and by mutual concern (129, p. 30). In the older Jewish communities of eastern Europe, the shtetls (129, p. 32):

To insist on privacy if you are not sinning is a serious misdemeanor.... One of the worst things you can say of a man is "he keeps it for himself" or "he hides it from others" whether "it" is money or wisdom, clothes or news.

Locked doors, isolation, avoidance of community control, arouse suspicion.... "Home people," ...are free to come in whenever they like at any time of the day....

Withdrawal is felt as attack, whether physical or psychological, and isolation is intolerable. "Life is with people"....

* * * * *

The freedom to observe and to pass judgment on one's fellows, the need to communicate and share events and emotions is inseparable from a strong feeling that individuals are responsible to and for each other.

The doctor's patient or lawyer's client are bound to speak openly and comprehensively of their problems; the communicant must tell all to his confessor. Spouses must not withhold from each other information relevant to their mutual love. Group dynamicists require full disclosure of relevant thoughts from participants in decision-making conferences.

Some withdrawal is permitted if it can be justified as necessitated in order to perform a service for the group. Thus a novice in the cloister may be permitted to sew or launder alone

where she can regain her composure. A journey alone on business allows a wife or husband to find repose. Again, claims of illness or need for extra sleep or rest or quiet are withdrawals legitimated by the promise of renewed ability to contribute to the common enterprise.

If negative feelings can be discharged outside the primary relationship itself and in a manner that does not affect that association, all may go well. The patient complains to a friend about his therapist and to his therapist about his friend. The child discusses the limitations of parents with his playmates; of playmates with his parents.

On occasion, however, there is no opportunity to discharge such feelings outside the group. Cloistered monks and nuns must spend all their hours together. So, in some cases, must the members of small utopian communities or of groups in hiding. Certain individuals, although able to go about in the larger social world, get no relief because their problems are so specialized they would not be understood by most other people or because their difficulties relate to a secret organization.

Faced with this problem among their members, some organizations have developed a special role, that of the informal confessor. In most cases, this is a senior member of the group, but not one who holds, or is likely to hold, an office which disciplines members. These characteristics insure that he will act on behalf of the organization, but only by means of friendly counsel. The confessor is usually bound by a vow of silence, thus assuring the dissident member

that his remarks will not be revealed. Discontent can be aired, the group being represented and given a chance to respond in a non-punitive fashion, yet, simultaneously, being insulated from deviant pressures (31, p. 192, 112).

Essayists on love often remark that, among the symptoms of growing devotion, is satisfaction with silence, with merely being together though "doing nothing." They are less likely to note something that seems typical of all situations in which people are to love one another over many areas of their lives and for long periods of time. An initial period of goodwill is followed by a time of great coolness or hostility. In these periods of stress, people may hold together in stark dependency, no graces lightening the burden of their need for each other, no respite at hand in which to enjoy such fruit as their relation bears. Yet this may be as much a part of loving as the moments of gaiety or consummation. Moreover, this cycle will be repeated should they be called upon to make some further, significant increase in their commitments to each other. The sequence is familiar in the "sunshine to storm" cycle as the child moves from infancy to early childhood or from late childhood to adolescence. It is often noted in observations of courship and marriage. Students of occupational careers have noted it in school-teachers and in managers of large concerns. Directors of institutions which provide long-term care for children expect it of many youngsters during the first year or two under their roof.

Two interpretations of the cycle are common. First, the individual can test the trustworthiness and depth of the affection

proffered him only by becoming a major liability. If that behavior is accepted, he is probably desired for what he is, nor for some particular service he performs. Second, love will require him to give up behaviors he may enjoy even though they appreciably weaken his potentialities. He may need to withdraw from a relationship to assess his own willingness to make a still greater commitment to it. In this sense, a withdrawal from intimacy or even open hostility may be a necessary preparation of the ground for deeper love.

When this preparation is understood, and, perhaps, cultivated, there is a possibility of guiding its course, mitigating if not eliminating its rigors. When, after a period of passive cooperation, his patient becomes hostile, the skilled psychotherapist sees enlarged opportunities for healing. He and the patient are now deeply and honestly involved with each other, not playing parts but struggling in an authentic human relationship. They now have a chance of finding and reshaping essential features of the patient's outlook, and of the physician's as well.

Spiritual advisors recognize similar opportunities. Certain steps in growth toward loving union with God are commonly observed, named, and managed (144). The Awakening of the Self is the joy of first recognition of God's presence and goodness. The Purgative Way is a period of self discipline to control and, more rigorously, exercise, the more obvious kinds of selfishness that separates a man from his holy friend. The Illuminated Way follows upon successful purgation, as a period of serene enjoyment of God's love. For many contemplatives, whether lay or religious, this stage is the culmination.

But others seek a deeper love which can be had only if the will as well as the more external aspects of behavior become consonant with God's purposes. The Dark Night of the Soul is the time of spiritual crucifixion when the man clings to his search, unable to turn back and gradually realizing that he cannot advance by his own power. Finally he asks to be accepted as he is and surrenders all pretensions to sufficiency. This can be an agony of years or decades or still unresolved at death. Verve and elan may vanish, spiritual dryness set in. God may seem unattainably distant or absent. The greatest of temptations, the most sacrilegious of thoughts, emptiness, unrelievable heaviness or congestion, all these are common symptoms. What remains is sheer need and a final, tenacious faith that one may even pray to abandon but cannot. If acceptance finally comes, acceptance of God for what He is and one's self for what it is, there opens the Unitive Way of a self at one with God. The imagery now is of iron penetrated by the fire or the drop of water blended into the ocean. This need not mean a loss of self. In Eastern cultures such loss is common; in the West it is unorthodox, for, in the West, the holy is love, not unfeeling fate and the union between man and God is mutual acceptance, not the soul's annihilation (32, 111).

These similarities in the struggle of the child's socialization, the healing of sick minds, the growth of friendships and marital love, and the reaching of souls toward a divine love raise problems for which many lovers are unprepared. Assuming devotion to be unalloyed beatitude, they are dismayed or crushed by the obligation

of the loved to grow, or, as lovers, are overwhelmed by the effort, skill, and commitment required to deal creatively with the developments they have nourished. They cannot accept dissent from their present views, even when the disagreement is directed toward helping them. They find it hard to see a conflict of responsible opinions as creative and lack skills to resolve such issues fruitfully.

Nothing is more fatal than to love or accept love beyond one's competence, yet nothing more certain than the flourishing of love beyond those bounds. Even when loved and lover can name what they are doing, when they understand enough to seek for those hindrances to the growth that alone can relieve the tension and can take comfort in knowledge that it is love, not madness, with which they wrestle, there is no certainty that they will have the strength or competence or opportunity to realize a fortunate conclusion.

Where love is wise, informed by experience and training, it moves, but moves gradually. Where love is institutionalized, there are methods for controlling as for promoting its growth. There is a routine of work, wakening, relaxation, bathing, and sleep, there is care for diet and health; and there are opportunities for privacy, withdrawal, deviance, candor, intimate interaction, and separation (19, 31, pp. 30-43, 206).

Routine and care sustain with a minimum of novel decisions. They underscore elemental dependencies and realities, provide time and opportunities for assimilating past experiences and the testing of new approaches. If directed only to preserving relations as they are, they generate conflicting feelings of obligation and rebellion

(14, 95). If directed to providing for future growth, they encourage development by affording participants with the experience of larger continuities and the fresh opportunities that a new day brings.

But routines have another, greater, significance. As we have seen, routinized, unrewarded, steady care and sacrifice characterize authentic love. It is not its only quality, but it is necessary and the persistence of such care in spite of adversities can take on a heroic quality rarely matched by more spectacular sacrifices, its very cumulativeness being sufficient to provide the energies needed for fresh advances. It, perhaps, affords evidence that the lover's need is also great, thus making it respectable for the beloved to accept his gifts (110, pp. 125-213).

Finally, routines require continued effort from the person seeking love. Submission to them indicates sufficiency of need and continued willingness to bear the costs of growth. It is evidence of strength to meet these requirements. Without this evidence, there is reason to doubt that love, as such, can be accepted. What is sought is, perhaps, hospitalization without therapy or, perhaps, resources to use, not for growth, but for whatever one pleases.

Like routines, periods of initiation serve to gauge the seeker's capacities and commitments. It is alien to the achievement of love that a novitiate or a series of diagnostic interviews or a courtship should be humiliating but they may be humbling experiences, and the intensity of the tests made do seem geared to the seriousness of the relationship into which people are to enter (113, 150). There also is evidence that, other things equal, the more severe

the preliminary testing, the greater is the candidate's initial commitment to the relationship when he finally enters it (8). This is interpreted as meaning that, in order to reduce his conflicts over the high costs of establishing the relationship, the initiate must stress for himself the intensity of his need for it.

AN INTEGRATION OF THESE OBSERVATIONS

Love, we said as our study began, is the commitment, knowingly, willingly, and responsibly to do whatever one can toward enhancing the powers, independence, and integration of another in some area of his conduct. Each of the many social arrangements we subsequently reviewed serves as a means for routinizing love--for establishing it, implementing it, or protecting it.

"Love is the commitment...." We have seen that the strength of this commitment and its constancy are tested. In this survey, we found that the requirements for continuous interaction, steady support, and the passing of an initiation provided such tests. The requirement for equality of need among the participants provided a guarantee of their faithfulness.

"Love is the commitment...to do whatever one can...." The diffuseness of love must also be established and repeatedly evaluated. Requirements for informality, personalization, and intimacy serve this purpose.

"Love is the commitment...to do whatever one can...in some area of his conduct." We found that alternating periods of harmony and conflict test the scope of love and that a variety of methods

are employed to perpetuate the relationship despite these shifts in affective climate. We found also that loving cannot escape the world in which it occurs and certain devices have been found especially suited for preserving its character even while the participants relate to that world as well as to each other.

Love occurs "knowingly, willingly, and responsibly." The autonomy of the love, whether it be an individual or an organization, seems to be one guarantee that the relationship is a matter of conscious choice and is entered willingly. Autonomy is likewise necessary for that freedom to allocate resources and commit oneself to choices which distinguish responsible action. Of equal importance in promoting responsible behavior--the practice of love within one's competence--are the presence of objective norms, binding upon lover and loved alike, and the tests of love's strength and scope, each requiring a decision about competence and willingness to enlarge the relationship. Again, the demand for continuous participation insures opportunities to expend the necessary effort.

Finally, love is directed toward "enhancing the powers, independence, and integration" of another. Some of our observations have shown how this objective is kept in view; others indicate devices by which one measures or guides movement toward such a goal. In keeping this objective in focus, equality of need among the participants is once again important, in this case to prevent dominance and exploitation. So is the requirement that the quality of the beloved's performance in the outer world be employed as an objective measure of the fruitfulness of the loving relationship. The several

procedures for testing the existence of interests that conflict with love's goal and for judging the ability to receive love are also relevant here.

Movement toward the goals of love is measured by the stages of loving and being loved. Many techniques discovered in our survey have arisen to promote one or more of these stages, to manage the strains they engender, and to break up resistance to further growth.

One might expect that the coherence and apparent lawfulness we observe in the social relationship called love would be reflected in systematizations of the philosophy of ethics. Ethical judgments and rules are the norms governing moral relationships which, in turn, have much in common with love. It is customary to speak of a relationship as moral to the extent that competent (responsible) persons, knowingly, freely, and willingly incur some responsibility or indebtedness toward one another in return for something of value which the others provide him. Love differs from other instances of moral association only in being especially diffuse, in having the objective of actualizing the other's potentialities as a person, and in often being directed toward the other in all his particularity. Thus, although not identical with all other moral associations, love has much in common with them and our ability to understand the logic of love would be advanced by the development of systematic principles of ethics.

Unfortunately, no well-established systematizations of ethics exist. A number of efforts to produce them have been shown untenable. The reasons for these failures need not be reviewed here, although

I believe they stem from internally confused and inconsistent definitions of the problem itself, from tendencies to view morality as a condition within the conduct of individuals rather than as a relationship among them, and from attempts to picture the behavior of individuals as governed solely by some variety of hedonistic principle. It is of immediate importance, however, to recognize that the present chaos in ethical theory represents a failure to systematize observations which ethical theorists generally agree appear to be orderly and lawful. Their dilemmas should not be taken to mean that these theorists have concluded that moral relations or their special forms, such as love, are empirically chaotic. To the contrary, contemporary efforts toward the reconstruction of ethical theory are founded explicitly on the opposite judgment (26, 27, 50, 89, 130).

The organizational pathologies to which particular approximations of love seem unusually susceptible should be understood as consequences of the special difficulty inherent in each of routinizing some aspect of love (39, 67, 94, 142). Take, for example, what C. S. Lewis calls "affection"--the loving association characterized by easy familiarity, warm comfortableness, and mutual acceptance of participants for what they are. Founded on an appreciation of people as they are at present, this relationship is threatened if they begin to change. Because affection typically appears without a very searching exploration of the equality of the participants' needs, or the responsibility of their commitment, persons become diffusely open to one another without strong safeguards against exploitation and other

injury. In friendship, by contrast, equality, responsibility, and many other criteria of love are usually well-established. Typical problems here, however, are the growth of mutual enjoyment at the expense of pressing commitments in the outer world and the loss of objectivity of judgment about the relationship and each other.

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